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CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

MOROCCO

PART 1

January to December 1947

(Continued from "Further Correspondence respecting Africa," Part 29)

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CONFIDENTIAL

CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING MOROCCO

PART 1.—JANUARY TO DECEMBER 1947

(Continued from "Further Correspondence respecting Africa," Part 29)

Z 13/13/28

No. 1

TANGIER BUDGET FOR 1947

Mr. Mallet to Mr. Bevin. (*Received 1st January*, 1947)

(No. 141) *Tangier*,
Sir, *24th December*, 1946

The Legislative Assembly of Tangier has just concluded a session in the course of which it passed the budget for 1947. The budget balances at just over 430 million fr., or a little under £400,000 at the present rate of exchange. The budget takes account of the rise in the cost of living by providing some 15 million fr. for increasing the salaries of employees of the Administration. In addition, the Assembly agreed that for a space of three months to start with, salaries not exceeding 500,000 fr. a year should be paid in pesetas, in order that the lower-paid officials might secure protection against the fall of the franc. This precaution is unlikely to prove effective if the peseta continues to fall as it has lately. The Assembly decided to suspend the taxes on certain articles of general consumption. This will afford some relief to the native inhabitants. The Assembly asked the Administration to report on the whole question of the way in which the concessionary companies for water, electric light, telephones, &c., are conducted, and a request was made to the Assembly to consider asking the Administration to frame a scheme of social legislation covering such matters as minimum wages, holidays with pay, accident insurance and working conditions from the point of view of health.

2. Of wider interest are the resolutions passed by the Assembly on the subjects of the police, the salaries of the higher officials of the Administration, and of the mixed tribunal.

3. In the matter of the police, the Assembly decided that, in view of the excessive expenses caused to the zone by the present organisation of the police, the Powers should be asked to contribute, as they had done in 1940 and before. The Assembly also asked that the police should be reorganised, so that a reduction might be made in the number of higher posts and in increase in that of effectives. This question was discussed by the Committee of Control on 23rd December, and my colleagues shared my feeling that there is little reason for the Powers to contribute now that the old gendarmerie has disappeared and the zone has a budget surplus of between 200 and 300 millions. The Committee of Control, however, agreed that the Belgian Consul-General should be invited to ask his Government to recall two of the Belgian instructors to the police, whose number is now excessive. The Administration has, moreover, decided to make certain reforms to increase the efficiency of the police and I hope that these will make it more difficult for the Spanish Consul-General to argue that public security was better in the days of the Spanish régime here.

4. The question of the emoluments of the higher officials provoked some very plain speaking. The Assembly feel that, as the result of the arrangements made by the Powers for a provisional period, which has now lasted for 15 months, the zone has been

saddled with two many officials. In their view, these officials are overpaid and members of the Assembly resent the fact that certain officials have been given fully furnished accommodation and cars for their own use. The fact that the Administrator has found it necessary to have his son-in-law as his paid assistant has also caused adverse comment. In consequence, the Assembly voted a resolution that the Powers should be asked, through the Committee of Control, to contribute towards the expenses of the zone in such a way as to make up in part for the excessive expenses of the statutory posts.

5. The Committee of Control decided to await formal communication of the Assembly's resolutions about a contribution towards the cost of the higher salaries and the reform of the mixed tribunal. Both resolutions are the expression of a widespread feeling of dissatisfaction with the Administration and the tribunal. There is no doubt that the Administrator is too old and that there are too many high officials, between whom national jealousies play a somewhat disturbing part. No caretaker Government can be expected to be as energetic as a more permanent Administration would be, but it would be unfair, especially as prices here have risen so much recently, to attempt to reduce the salaries of the higher officials just because, through no fault of their own, they have overstayed the term for which they were appointed. If the Administrator himself could be replaced by a younger and energetic man I have little doubt that reforms and economies could be made, but the radical faults of the organisation here cannot be corrected until a conference is held to draft a new Statute. Unless this is likely to be indefinitely delayed, or Tangier's present affluence should disappear, I see no reason why the Powers should put their hands in their pockets to contribute towards the salaries of the higher personnel.

6. There is no doubt, either, that the mixed tribunal gives grounds for dissatisfaction. It was, in fact, a request by the judges that their salaries should be increased which was the occasion for the present outburst on the part of the Assembly. The Finance Commission rejected this request and the judges appealed to the Committee of Control, who expressed to the Assembly a wish that something might be done to relate the judges' salaries more nearly to those of the assistant administrators. This wish was in turn rejected by the Assembly, who proceeded to ask for the total reform of the tribunal. Although the Assembly is the only body which can claim to represent Tangier as a whole, it is, in fact, predominantly a body of merchants, property owners and professional men, who are primarily interested in the maintenance of Tangier's economic prosperity. They do not hesitate to express their criticism of the Administration and the latter complain, on their side, of the obstruction with which the Assembly meets any proposal which might result in a restriction of the profits of traders here or in the application of controls to Tangier's régime of economic freedom. I have little doubt that members of the Assembly realise that their requests cannot well be met until a new Statute is drafted, and I have a feeling that their principal motive was to record, as against a day when the conference shall meet, their dissatisfaction with certain aspects of the present régime.

I have, &c.
W. I. MALLET.

Z 687/687/28

No. 2

ANNUAL REPORT ON TANGIER FOR 1946

Mr. Mallet to Mr. Bevin. (*Received* 18*th January*)

(No. 7)

Sir, *Tangier*, 8*th January*, 1947

I have the honour to enclose herein my report on events in Tangier during the year 1946.

I have, &c.
W. I. MALLET.

Enclosure in No. 2

Annual Report for 1946

The year 1946 has seen the French regain completely their dominant political position in Tangier. This has been due to two main causes, one incidental and the other inherent in the Tangier Statute as reaffirmed by the Paris Agreement of 1945. The incidental cause was the presence in Tangier, when the International Administration was restored, both of M. Le Fur, as Acting Administrator, and of the Shereefian Police Force. As a result, an Administration packed with French nominees was already in being before the Portuguese Administrator, the Belgian Assistant Administrator of Finance and the Belgian Police Mission arrived. The inherent cause is the fact that the administration of 75 per cent. of the inhabitants of the zone is in the hands of the Mendoub who is controlled by the Assistant Administrator for Native Affairs, who is French. That he is a conscientious official is beside the point. What matters is that as long as this state of affairs is perpetuated, so long will the French have a stranglehold on the Mendoubia and the Cadi's Court. The Moroccan, Moslem or Jew, is essentially a time-server, and knows where to turn for halfpence and how to avoid kicks; the dispenser of both is in an impregnable position. Politically, no other Power approaches the French in Tangier.

2. By playing up the Nationalists, the Americans have retained a certain position, and the visit of the largest battleship, followed by the largest aircraft-carrier in the world, not to mention an unending procession of cruisers and destroyers, has kept their power politics well in the local eye.

3. Spain has lost ground steadily throughout the year. Few, if any, of the Spanish Consul-General's complaints and requests have met with any measure of success, in spite of his threats of suspending supplies to Tangier of one commodity or another, and of his going so far on one occasion as to suspend the delivery of fish by Spanish smacks to this port. To counteract that move, Tangier is slowly acquiring a fishing fleet of its own, and not only a market but a source of supply of diesel oil will be lost to the unfortunate Spanish fishermen.

4. Great Britain has no pretensions to hold a pre-eminent position in Tangier affairs, but we can derive some satisfaction from the fact that we are one of the " Big Three " (France, United States and ourselves) on the Committee of Control, where we can be said to have held the initiative throughout the year. Furthermore, our strong team in the Legislative Assembly, which is by far the best balanced and most influential national representation, has gone far with its initiation and advocacy of common-sense legislation to uphold British prestige.

5. In the economic sphere, the Americans are dominant. They own two commercial wireless stations and still operate an originally American-owned broadcasting station which has recently been sold to a Spanish buyer. Towards the end of the year, chromium-plated, super-streamlined American cars began to appear on the market in increasing numbers. American consumer goods of all sorts filled the shops at prices with which corresponding goods of British and French manufacture were in no position to compete. British light cars were well on the market early in the year. Other British goods have come in small quantities at uncompetitive prices. The French have tried hard to get on to the market with luxury goods such as cosmetics and ladies' dress accessories. French wines have also appeared in abundance at prices which are reasonable only for holders of sterling and dollars. Peseta and franc rates in relation to sterling and dollars have fluctuated according to the demand for the stronger currencies as British or American goods became available for export and sterling or dollars were required. The peseta and franc rates for sterling were pesetas 82 and francs 870 on 1st January, and pesetas 116 and francs 1,185 on 31st December.

6. These rates of exchange give a hint of the difficulties with which a top-heavy and cumbersome international administration, torn with intestine troubles, has had to cope. The franc and peseta are legal tender in Tangier. The zone produces virtually none of the necessities of life, and we have to buy them all abroad with a depreciating currency, a currency over which the Administration has no control, subject, in this free money market, to the direct impact of world values. Added then to the increased cost of production in other countries is the diminished purchasing power of our unpegged currency. The Administration has failed—could it do otherwise?—in what the public demanded of it most insistently, namely, to stop the rise in the cost of living. Yet this was an inconvenience more than a hardship, for misery in the zone has been reduced. Misery in a country like Morocco is not to be assessed as hunger but rather as the borderline of starvation. The fact that the local equivalent of the poorhouse is not working to capacity or anything like it,

shows how misery on that assessment is, in fact, reduced.

7. It is the self-same impact of world events which is largely responsible for the housing crisis and for the erratic character of the city supply of water, light and power. The population of Tangier has increased by 30,000 since 1939, and in that period very few houses have been built and nothing has been done to increase the capacity of water and light plants. Even now building materials are scarce and expensive. The flight of capital from Spain and France to Tangier has, indeed, resulted in the building of some ordinary blocks of flats at luxury prices, but these are hardly a contribution to the solution of a problem the dimensions of which may be truly alarming in the course of ten years when it is borne in mind that the increasing population indicated above is almost entirely the result of natural procreation. The Administration and Legislative Assembly attacked the problem with the only tool which lay ready to their hand—legislation. The rent law has been the Aunt Sally of the press and the public ever since its entry into force. It was not a bad law. At the same time it was not a law which vested interests could afford to see working smoothly. It had minor inconsistencies, admittedly, and ambiguities. These were seized upon and the law was made virtually unworkable. This whole episode serves once again to demonstrate the real necessity of a legal adviser for the amateur legislators of Tangier.

8. Nor has the International Administration been labouring against world conditions alone. It has been struggling against the inflexibility of its own statute. Nowhere has this been more clear than in the case of the police. The inadequacy of that force became apparent at the time of the Derkaoua incident (see paragraph 10 below), when it was seen to be doubtful whether it could contain a serious local demonstration. Its inadequacy was emphasised during the discussion of security plans for the eventual visit of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan to Tangier. It was estimated that a force half as big again as the present force, and much more efficient, was required. However, any increase in the force demanded a unanimous vote of the Committee of Control to modify the Paris Agreement; a unanimous vote was not forthcoming. The inadequacy of the force was finally and practically established when a picturesque political murder took place within a stone's throw of the very centre of the town. The press, ever alert on matters of civic interest, seized on the affair. There were political axes to grind and the consequent flight of sparks. The Spanish Consul-General attended the funeral of the murdered Spaniard (a Republican!) and raised a subscription for his widow. Fresh murders and hold-ups were reported daily. The increased population of the city of course demands an augmented police force, and it came as a shock to all when the Chief of Police, replying to a question in the Legislative Assembly, stated that this city of 100,000 inhabitants was policed at night by fifteen policemen. A correction of that statement subsequently explained that, while there were only fifteen policemen in the streets at any given moment, a further forty-five were readily available.

9. The absence of immediate physical distress has probably contributed to the spate of complaints against the present order, and to the throwing into relief of the many administrative shortcomings mentioned above. In October, things came to a head when demonstrations, which were in direct contravention of local law, took place, the demonstrators marching to the Mendoubia and demanding various reforms and the removal of current abuses. The threat of further demonstrations, which might have become more serious, was removed by the presence of one of His Majesty's ships in the port of Tangier, and the Administration forthwith addressed itself to rectifying some of the more obvious abuses. These demonstrations, however, were soon to find an echo in the Legislative Assembly, which, goaded by the general ineptitude of the Administration, came to its new session in a lively mood and demanded administrative reforms which struck at the statute itself: fewer highly paid foreign officials, improvement of the police, reform of the Mixed Tribunal, the last a reform which has been in demand, and rightly so, for twenty-one years.

10. The demonstrations mentioned above appeared to be engineered, many of the participants being well-known local touts. However, the Derkaoua sect joined in the second demonstration and the Nationalists (the Moroccan Unity Party) decided to make the cause their own. This party, originally a Spanish Zone party created by the High Commissioner, General Beigbeder, now carries out its chief activities under the precarious shelter of the international régime. Tangier houses their club and the press which prints their French newspaper *La Voix du Maroc*. Their Arabic paper *Ouahda-el-Moghrebia* has been suppressed in Tetuan. The leader of the party, Mohammed Mekki Nasiri, has fled the Spanish Zone, and is semi-permanently established in Tangier. During the year this city has been a rallying point for Nationalist leaders from all over Morocco, who have come here on longer or shorter visits, drawn by internationalism and by the ever open arms of the United States Legation.

11. To talk of nationalism in a single zone of Morocco is almost a contradiction in terms. A report on Tangier would be incomplete without it, and a mention of nationalism would be incomplete without referring to it as an all-Moroccan movement. From the Tangier angle it is apparent that the various nationalist groups of the three zones have more or less the same aim, that is, Moroccan independence. The divergence of views as to how that is to be achieved reflects the varying degrees of optimism and self-complacency of the groups concerned. We use the word "group" advisedly. We are not dealing with recognised parties, nor, beyond the heads and committees, could they be called organised parties. This should not be allowed to detract from their importance, for in any illiterate country a small group of educated men who know what they want may wield considerable force. Undoubtedly these groups constitute no immediate physical threat to the "protecting" Powers, but they do constitute an Achilles heel through which communism could attack them.

12. At the beginning of 1947 Tangier presents a visitor from Europe the picture of almost incredible ease, prosperity and physical well-being. The régime here seems at first sight to be an excellent advertisement for international co-operation. A closer examination will show that, while this régime owes its existence to the protection of the Powers, the latter can take little credit for its present prosperity. Moreover, the Powers are much criticised for the failings of the Administration which they evolved for Tangier as a result of the need for reconciling their conflicting national aims. From the local point of view it is to be hoped that the present year will see a new statute drafted which will meet the criticisms that are justified, but no new régime will serve as a really good advertisement for international control which is not more freely international in its operation and does not take more adequate account of the needs and aspirations of all the inhabitants of the zone.

Z 5876/687/28 No. 3

ANNUAL ECONOMIC (A) REPORT ON TANGIER ZONE OF MOROCCO, 1946

Mr. Mallet to Mr. Bevin. (*Received 24th June*)

(No. 64)

Sir, *Tangier*, 13*th June*, 1947

I have the honour to transmit herewith a report on the economic situation in the Tangier Zone during the year 1946.

2. This report should be considered as complementary to the more detailed one covering the first nine months of 1946, transmitted to you on 14th December, 1946.

I have, &c.

W. I. MALLET.

Enclosure in No. 3

Economic (A) Report on Tangier Zone of Morocco, 1946

Introduction

The year 1946 was the first complete year of office of the International Administration set up in October 1945. No difficulties worthy of mention arose to hamper the development of trade in general, and local commerce, profiting by the almost unique facilities of the Tangier free money market, continued to flourish unabated.

2. Although no lack of food-stuffs or of manufactured articles was experienced, the cost of living, far from diminishing, rose another 36 per cent. during the course of the year. Little improvement can be expected in this respect as long as the United States, with its high currency, continues to be the main supplier of the zone, especially for such articles as flour, sugar and fats, which, before the war were supplied by France at very cheap rates.

3. Any large-scale revival of French industrial output will, so far as Tangier is

concerned, constitute a serious menace to all exporting countries. Whereas she exports to foreign countries in "devises," she delivers to Tangier in francs. This currency on the local free money market is quoted at about half the official clearing rates and goods are thus landed here from France at prices defying all competition. (A Renault car sold in Gibraltar at £350 is sold in Tangier for £165.) If for the moment the effect has not been felt to any great extent on account of the inability of French manufacturers to satisfy the demand, the danger is very real, and, should conditions remain unchanged, the favourable rate should allow France at some future date not only to regain her pre-war position but to obtain almost a monopoly of exports to this territory.

Foreign Import Trade

4. Final figures for the year 1946 show that 49,130 tons of goods with a value of 3,559,647,620 fr. were imported into Tangier. (£3,850,000 at average rate of 950 to the pound.) In 1938, a normal pre-war year, 41,169 tons of merchandise, worth only 93,693,000 fr. (£631,000) were imported. This increase of only 20 per cent. in the tonnage of merchandise imported, producing a corresponding increase in value of over six times, cannot be attributed solely to the increase in world prices and must be considered abnormal. The explanation lies in the fact that there has been a marked change in the type of goods imported into Tangier prior to the war and at the present time. Statistics show that whereas in 1938 manufactured products accounted for only 43 per cent. of the total value of imports, in 1946 they accounted for 64 per cent.

5. This development tends necessarily to increase the average value per ton imported especially when it has meant the importation of high-priced luxury goods as has been the case in Tangier. Twenty-five per cent. of Tangier's total imports was composed of watches and lighters (491 million fr.), radios and accessories (178 million), and cars, tyres and spare parts (326 million). All these articles cater for the demands of Metropolitan Spain and the neighbouring French and Spanish Zones of Morocco, still in the grip of controlled economies.

6. Not only has the type of goods imported experienced a change compared with pre-war standards but also the sources of supply have varied considerably. The United States, Spain and Switzerland have replaced France, Belgium and other countries whose economies have been shattered by the war, as principal suppliers to Tangier. The main changes were :—

1938

	Per cent.
France	30·8
Belgium	8·5
United Kingdom ...	8·4
United States	7·9
Japan	7·6
Italy	7·0
Holland	7·0
Germany	2·8
Spain	1·9(1)

1946

	Per cent.
United States	36·5
Switzerland	17·9
Spain	17·1
United Kingdom ...	10·8
France	2·2
Belgium	1·1

7. The United Kingdom share of the 3,559,647,620 fr. of imports into Tangier amounted to 384,608,273 fr. (approximately £405,000 at the average rate of 950 to the pound). A further 46,646,818 fr., or approximately £50,000 worth of merchandise, were imported from the sterling area. These figures represent 10·8 per cent. and 1·3 per cent. respectively of the total imports. Considering that in 1938 our share was 8·4 per cent. and 0·5 per cent. the results cannot be considered unsatisfactory.

8. The chief articles supplied from the United Kingdom were diamonds, whisky, gin, cars and accessories, pharmaceutical and chemical products, waste rubber, spices, woollen suit lengths, electrical equipment, tin plate, perfumery, sports equipment, cycles and motor-cycles and token shipments of jams and biscuits.

Foreign Export Trade

9. Only 10,930 tons of merchandise with a value of 486,700,000 fr. were exported in 1946 from Tangier to foreign countries. These exports consisted mainly of vegetable fibre, tunny fish, hides, almonds, casings, motor cars and accessories. These products cannot wholly be classified as of

(1) Abnormally low through civil war.

Tangier origin, as a substantial proportion of the tunny, vegetable fibre, hides, almonds and casings is imported into Tangier from the neighbouring Spanish and French Zones of Morocco under local barter arrangements. In the same way many of the cars and accessories that are imported here from the United Kingdom and United States are later re-exported by their purchasers to Metropolitan Spain and Portugal.

10. Spain imported cars and accessories, tunny fish and casings; the United States, vegetable fibre, tunny and leather goods; France, tunny fish, hides, almonds and vegetable fibre; Malta, tunny fish; Sweden, Italy and Switzerland, tunny and vegetable fibre; and Portugal, cars and vegetable fibre. The United Kingdom has not as yet renewed her pre-war imports from Tangier.

11. The balance of trade with foreign countries closed for the year with the considerable deficit of 3,074,700,000 fr. (£3,236,000) or approximately 75 per cent. of Tangier's total imports. The financing of this commercial deficit constitutes one of the mysteries of the economic life of Tangier, and is perhaps one of the most remarkable monetary curiosities offered by the world to-day. The othodox economic principle that a country or territory in order to be prosperous must have a more or less well balanced import and export trade would not seem to apply to Tangier. Tangier prospers, and thanks to her international status, her geographical position and her free money market, continues to counterbalance this considerable deficit by the steady influx, by both legal and illegal means, of foreign capital into the Zone. The two countries whose currencies are suffering the most through this state of affairs remain Spain and France.

Public Finance

12. The International Administration for the year 1946 budgeted for receipts of 360,168,000 fr. and expenses of 359,188,000 francs. Final figures, not yet officially published, are expected to show that receipts were 649,584,000 fr. and expenses 317,339,000 fr., leaving a surplus of 352,245,000 francs. This unexpectedly large surplus was almost entirely due to the very large revenue from the customs duty of 12½ per cent. *ad valorem* on all imports. It can be expected that as long as the large quantities of valuable manufactured articles continue to be imported in order to satisfy the demands created by the large floating population and the smuggling trade to Spain, French and Spanish Morocco, the financial situation of the zone will remain satisfactory. The Administration have decided to invest 250 million of the surplus funds in public works, roads and drains, 50 million in port improvements and 50 million in the purchase of equipment to improve the present inadequate water supply.

Private Finance

13. Company formation increased with every month that passed and the year 1946 closed with the record high number of 446 Tangier companies registered at the Mixed Tribunal. Prior to the war the normal yearly average was 60. It would appear from this considerable increase that capitalists on the look out for a place possessing the triple advantage of being sheltered from the upheaval of wars and politics, from the inquisitiveness of fiscal authorities and within easy reach of most countries, have decided that Tangier fulfils their requirements in a greater measure than Luxembourg, Jersey, Guernsey and Lichtenstein, where similar facilities exist for the forming of companies. Although the chief promoters of these companies continue to be Spanish and French, there was an increase towards the end of the year in the number of Swiss subjects who were attracted by the possibilities of Tangier companies as a means of avoiding the rising taxation in their own country.

Exchange

14. During 1946 the Tangier money market showed little indication of regaining confidence in either the peseta or the franc. Both currencies deteriorated steadily against sterling, the dollar, the escudo and the Swiss franc, and at the end of the year under review the peseta was quoted at 100 to the £ and 27 to the $ (official clearing rates 44 and 11 respectively). The Moroccan franc likewise dropped to 1,150 against sterling and to 290 against the $ (official clearing rates 480 and 120). This continued depreciation of the peseta, the dominating local money, against the currencies of the chief exporting countries to this territory naturally tends to increase the cost of living. Wages and salaries paid in the majority of cases in pesetas have remained stationary, causing great hardship among the lower paid population.

Legislation and Administration

15. The following are the chief laws and regulations promulgated during the year 1946 :—

Law increasing penal and civil fines.
Law establishing a special tax on public spectacles.
Law establishing a tax of 10 per cent. on manufactured tobacco.
Law establishing a tax on property holders for the upkeep of drains.
Law abolishing the " droit de porte."
Law establishing a tax on tyres and lighters.
Law regulating the relations between landlords and tenants and rents.
Law regulating the export of food-stuffs of prime necessity and the building up of stocks of security.
Law increasing the guarantee to be deposited by insurance companies established in the zone.
Law authorising the withdrawal from the reserve fund of the amount necessary to repay the 5 per cent. 1931 loan of the " Société du Port."
Law authorising the water company to increase their rates.

Conclusion

16. Tangier to-day is one of the best-dressed shop windows in the world, where goods from every country vie with each other in price and quality. Business is booming and will continue to do so as long as so many countries in Europe are obliged to maintain controlled economies, currency restrictions, &c. Nevertheless, this market, which for the last seven years has been a seller's paradise, is becoming a buyer's one as increased supplies become available. This fact should be borne in mind by United Kingdom manufacturers when quoting their prices. British goods with the " made in England " label are still sought after and local importers will always buy them in preference to those of other countries as long as the difference in price does not exceed 20 per cent.

Imports into Tangier

1*st January*, 1946, *to* 31*st December*, 1946

	Kilog.	*Francs*		*Kilog.*	*Francs*
United States ...	18,327,011	1,299,576,933	China	16,721	3,945,482
Switzerland	201,310	637,457,641	Algeria	79,149	3,457,236
Spain	12,442,475	608,081,781	Cuba	20,454	3,010,998
United Kingdom ...	2,662,919	384,608,273	Portuguese Possessions in Asia	6,896	2,564,184
France	262,507	78,086,098	Mexico	2	2,346,200
Brazil	262,507	58,408,597	Uruguay	29,148	2,033,804
Holland	1,290,862	51,241,648	British Mediterranean Possessions ...	105,096	1,826,576
Sweden	594,081	46,515,281	British Possessions in East Africa ...	11,579	1,496,904
Argentina	219,250	46,388,351	Madagascar	7,765	855,896
Belgium	4,216,628	39,711,746	Turkey	6,449	756,168
Portuguese East Africa	414,653	38,608,711	British Possessions in America	1,831	591,308
Venezuela	3,572,034	38,215,424	Czechoslovakia ...	293	526,951
Portuguese West Africa	435,175	37,094,326	Germany	2,012	452,720
Portugal	593,606	25,691,660	Austria	133	324,858
Canada	639,718	23,124,884	Finland	5,069	307,650
Paraguay	256,712	21,836,274	Belgian Equatorial Africa	1,205	107,000
Denmark	100,361	16,956,061	Palestine	1	11,200
Canary Islands ...	1,381,996	15,066,984	French West Africa...	35	3,800
British India	79,858	12,656,452	Guadaloupe	1	800
Hayti	163,355	12,637,028			
Norway	163,422	7,512,825			
Japan	13,191	7,494,143			
Persia	248,179	7,071,086			
Italy	17,062	6,558,427			
Syria	96,171	5,212,792			
Union of South Africa	3,846	4,816,335			
Iraq	177,297	4,398,124		49,130,025	3,559,647,620

Z 6198/6198/28 No. 4

HEADS OF MISSIONS AT TANGIER, 1947

Mr. Mallet to Mr. Bevin. (*Received 4th July*)

(No. 71. Confidential)
Sir, *Tangier, 27th June, 1947*

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith my annual report on heads of missions at Tangier for the year 1947.

I have, &c.
W. I. MALLET.

Enclosure in No. 4

Report on Heads of Missions, 1947

NOTE.—The Tangier Statute reduced the diplomatic agencies of all signatory Powers to consulates. All Powers sitting on the Committee of Control (and Italy) are represented by consuls-general, with the exception of the United States, which has not recognised the Statute and whose representative in Tangier is both diplomatic agent and consul-general.

Belgium

M. de Radiguès de Chennevière (arrived 19th February, 1945).

M. de Radiguès was counsellor in Paris at the outbreak of war and subsequently passed some time in a concentration camp. He is industrious and painstaking and enjoys preparing memoranda for the Committee of Control. As he is also able, he is a very useful colleague. He has a pleasant if slightly malicious sense of humour. Both he and his wife, by whom he has three children, are socially minded and most friendly and pleasant colleagues. They both speak good English. M. de Radiguès has other grown-up children in Belgium by his first wife.

France

M. Edmond de Beauverger (arrived 5th March, 1945).

*M. de Beauverger is an officer *de carrière* of the French diplomatic service, who was at the Quai d'Orsay for the period preceding the war and on the collapse of France was appointed " chef du protocole " to the Vichy Ministry for Foreign Affairs. It was not, however, many months before he saw the light and resigned, in consequence of which he found re-employment at Algiers under the Provisional French Government. (Written in 1946.) M. de Beauverger takes his work very seriously and appears to be rather frightened of the Residency-General at Rabat. He certainly does nothing without their instructions, and when he professes to have been kept in the dark by Rabat he does not always carry conviction. It is probably impossible for the French representative in Tangier to be an absolutely frank colleague: certainly with M. de Beauverger I often have the feeling that his idea of frank collaboration and mine would not always be the same. But I like him and he is quick and intelligent to work with. He speaks good English. Mme. de Beauverger is frequently absent: she has very poor health. M. and Mme. de Beauverger have two grown-up daughters in France and a boy who is just finishing the Lycée here.

Italy

M. Casto Caruso (arrived 7th November, 1946).

M. Caruso was at one time assistant private secretary to Ciano, a post from which, he says, he was moved in 1938 at the request of the Germans. If so, it is odd that he should then have been appointed to Prague. It is also remarkable that his daughter, born in Prague, should have been christened Franka. M. Caruso professes to desire to co-operate closely with me, but I am not quite sure yet that I trust him. As Italy has not ratified the peace treaty, M. Caruso is not yet a member of the Committee of Control and our official relations are slight, and M. Caruso's chief concern is to pull his colony together and to restart the various Italian cultural institutions in Tangier. If Italy enters the Committee of Control this year, M. Caruso will be its president in 1948.

Mme. Caruso is a neat and cheerful person. Both she and her husband were apparently ill before coming here and both talk a good deal about their health. Neither speak English.

Netherlands

M. Paul Staal (arrived 23rd January, 1946).

M. Staal is a retired member of the Netherlands consular service and spent almost his entire career in the Far East, India and Australia. During the war he and his wife suffered considerable hardships in Holland under German occupation. His two topics of conversation are the achievements of the British in India and his experiences in Holland during the war. On both he is rather a bore. At the Committee of Control he hardly speaks. But he is friendly and sensible. Mme. Staal is a terrific talker and slightly odd. She has now broken down in health and has left Tangier for treatment.

Portugal

M. Vasco Pereire da Cunha (arrived 25th June, 1945).

M. da Cunha was born in 1901. He served as consul-general in London during the war and both he and his wife have a genuine admiration and liking for England. They are a tiny couple and he is lame in one leg, but she is particularly charming and both are intelligent and have a sense of humour. He plays a useful and intelligent part in the work of the Committee of Control, though his chief concern here is the maintenance of the prestige of the Portuguese Administrator. Not an easy task. They have been absent from Tangier for several weeks now and rumour says that they are to be transferred. I shall be sorry. Both M. and Mme. da Cunha speak some English. They have no children.

Spain

Señor Don Cristóbal del Castillo (arrived 10th September, 1945).

Señor del Castillo joined the Spanish diplomatic service in 1917. He was minister-counsellor in Paris before the war and minister in Athens before serving here as consul-general from 1942–44, when he was appointed Assistant Under-Secretary of State in Madrid. I understand that during the war he gave the impression of being anti-British, if so, he has certainly changed his tune, for he is always emphasising the need for co-operation between Spain and the United Kingdom and the United States. He feels acutely the difficulties of his position as representative of a country which has been forced to relinquish her illegal occupation of Tangier, but still considers herself to have a stronger claim to predominance here than the French. He therefore

keeps to himself as much as possible and tries to prevent repercussions in Tangier of Spanish political problems, and, apart from making long statements whenever he feels it necessary to place Spanish claims on record, he seems anxious to avoid causing serious difficulties on the Committee of Control. He is undoubtedly one of the most able members of the committee. He professes himself to be a Monarchist. His wife, who is a charming lady from Bilbao, speaks English.

United States

Mr. Paul H. Alling (arrived 2nd July, 1945).

Mr. Alling was born in 1896. His first post was that of vice-consul at Beirut. In 1928, after service in Aleppo and Damascus, he was transferred to the State Department and served for several years in the Near Eastern and African Division. He also served at the San Francisco Conference. He told my predecessor that his strong pro-Arab sympathies had made it difficult for him to agree with the State Department's policy towards Palestine. He is now about to be transferred to Damascus as minister.

While he is personally very friendly, kind and courteous, I am afraid that Mr. Alling has been a disappointing colleague. The real trouble is that he is lazy and, as he takes no exercise, he finds that the soft climate of Tangier does not suit him. This seems to make him unwilling to make the effort of co-operation which his foreign colleagues might hope for. His position is, of course, far from easy, for, while his Government have accepted the 1945 provisional régime for Tangier, they have not recognised the original Tangier Statute. The United States representative is thus a controlling member of an international administration which the United States Government does not recognise. Moreover, they still maintain their capitulatory rights and the diplomatic status of their representative in Morocco. Mr. Alling and his staff are continuously on the look-out for attempts by the French to whittle their rights away: their reaction is a distrust of the French which they do not trouble to hide. In fact, it must be admitted that the lack of tact which American officials sometimes show in their conduct of official affairs here does little to remove French suspicion of American policy in Morocco. Moreover, Mr. Alling is very loath to commit himself on anything without instructions from Washington.

Mrs. Alling keeps up an incessant flow of trivial small talk and likes always to be the centre of attraction. They have two daughters.

Z 6386/98/28 No. 5

FRENCH MOROCCO: CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS

Mr. Duff Cooper to Mr. Bevin. (*Received* 10*th July*)

(No. 161. Saving) (Telegraphic) *Paris,* 9*th July*, 1947.

The press of 6th July announced the signature by the Sultan of Morocco of three important decrees embodying new constitutional and administrative reforms. Five new Moroccan Under-Secretaries of State are to be appointed to maintain liaison between the Government of the Sultan and the principal administrative services, which have been newly organised into the following departments: finance, commerce, and agriculture, trade, public works, industrial production, mines and communications, social affairs and public health. The members of the Sultan's Government (Maghzen) and the heads of these new administrations are to be formed into a Council, which is to meet once a month under the chairmanship of the Grand Vizier. A Council of Viziers is also to meet under the Sultan, whenever convened by the latter. A Moroccan legal adviser is to be appointed to assist the Sultan in studying official documents drawn up for his approval.

2. It is stated in an official communiqué issued by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs that these new measures are designed to promote a closer liaison between the Sultan's Government and the French Administration. They are regarded as a stage only in the administrative reorganisation of the country, which is designed to lead Morocco from feudalism to a democratic régime. The communiqué adds that the acceptance of the reforms by the Sultan shows that, in spite of the Tangier incidents, relations between the latter and the French Government have been restored to normal.

3. The background of the reforms was explained by the Resident-General, General Juin, in an exclusive interview granted to the newspaper *Combat*, in which the general evidently sought to put the Sultan's nationalist activities into their true perspective by emphasising the backward and patriarchal nature of the Shereefian régime, in contrast with the progressive reforms planned by the French. He was at pains to make it clear that French Government intend to pursue the policy of the firm hand, and that, while sincerely desirous of reform, did not intend to be deflected from their course by nationalist agitation.

4. After stating that he was relieved to find the country calmer than he had been led to expect, General Juin stressed the cordiality of his reception. During his voyage in the south of the country, he had made contact with most of the pashas and kaids of the region, many of whom he knew since Lyautey's day. He had found them just as they had always been, confident in France provided that the French were capable of bringing them order, justice and benevolent rule.

5. Morocco had evolved, and would continue to evolve, since that was the purpose of the French Administration, but this progress must take place in an orderly manner. General Juin regarded it as his first duty to restore order, with energy, but without brutality or compulsion. During the war France's difficulties had often been regarded as a sign of great weakness, and weakness for a Moslem was unforgivable. Certain democratic reforms had already been carried out. These must be maintained and others introduced. Progress would be encouraged, but he would attempt no demagogic solutions. Moslem affairs could not be judged by European standards and Arabs could not be assimilated to the electors of Normandy or other parts of France.

6. He intended to consolidate the Sultan's Government by building up, step by step, a Moroccan Constitution. The Sultan should be backed by a Council of Ministers chosen from among progressive young Moroccans, who had benefited from French educational facilities and were capable of playing a useful part in executive government. The time had come to replace many minor European officials by Moroccans. It was natural that the Moroccans should wish to play a part in their own affairs, but this development must take place in an orderly way. He would allow neither the "blackmail of the Maghzen" nor the "demogogic agitation of the nationalists."

7. In the past the patriarchal administration of the country had been respected, but now the young elements in the country were interested in politics. The proposed reforms might seem elementary to European observers, but it should not be forgotten that Morocco was still living in a fuedal régime, and that, in fact, they constituted a veritable revolution.

Z 6875/52/69 No. 6

MOROCCO: REFORM OF SHEREEFIAN GOVERNMENT

Acting Consul-General Isherwood to Mr. Bevin. (*Received* 25*th July*)

(No. 39)

Sir, *Rabat*, 10*th July*, 1947

I have the honour to report the publication in the *Bulletin Officiel* of the protectorate, dated 4th July, 1947, of three "dahirs," copies of which I enclose,(1) instituting a reform of the "Makhzen"—the Shereefian Government.

2. The first dahir deals with the reorganisation of the Makhzen. It states in article 1 that the administration of the Shereefian Empire is assured by the central Shereefian Government, which is composed of:—

(1) A Prime Minister with the rank of Grand Vizier.
(2) A Vizier of Justice.
(3) A Vizier of "Habous" or Pious Foundations.
(4) A Director of the Protocol.
(5) A Deputy of the Grand Vizier for Education.

There is no change here from the original Administration, except that the title of "Délégué du Grand Vizir à l'Enseignement" has been changed to "Naïb du Grand Vizir à l'Enseignement."

Article 3 of the dahir states that the Grand Vizier is assisted by—

(*a*) Five delegates, who will act as a permanent mission of liaison to the Protectorate Administration. These are:—
  (1) Delegate for Finance.
  (2) Delegate for Agriculture and Commerce.
  (3) Delegate for Public Works, Industrial Production and Post, Telephone and Telegraph Services.
  (4) Delegate for Public Health.
  (5) Delegate for Social Services.

(*b*) A legal adviser to the Shereefian Government.

3. The second dahir states that the Council of Viziers will meet under the

(1) Not printed.

presidency of the Sultan whenever he considers it necessary.

4. The third dahir creates a Council of Viziers and Directors of the Protectorate Administration, which will meet once every month to study questions of general interest.

5. There are two important modifications in the composition of the Makhzen. Firstly, the creation of the posts of the five delegates, who are to be attached to the principal departments of the Protectorate Administration, and who, it is announced in an official communiqué from the Residency-General, will have the rank of Under-Secretaries of State. Secondly, the creation of the post of legal adviser to the Shereefian Government, an important part of whose functions will be the examination, in liaison with the legal adviser to the protectorate, of the drafts of the various decrees and dahirs before their presentation to the Sultan for his approval.

6. The new delegates all come from families of notables noted for their loyalty to the French Administration in Morocco. Three of them are natives of Fez, and the other three from Salé. They are young and have already had experience in the Protectorate Administration. A list of their names, with biographical details, is enclosed.(1)

7. There has been one change in the original vizirates, Moulay Larbi el Alaoui, who was the Delegate for Education, has been made Pasha of Settat, and has been replaced by Si Abdesselam el Fassi. Moulay Larbi, before he became Delegate for Education, was Khalifa of the Pasha of Marrakesh. He then spent most of his time in Tangier, where he acted as the Sultan's informal representative. He was the subject of Mr. Gascoigne's despatch No. 298 of 5th September, 1944, and of previous despatches. Because of his intrigues against the Residency while in Tangier, the Resident-General, M. Puaux, protested to the Sultan and eventually had him appointed Delegate for Education in order, it was said, to keep an eye on him. Moulay Larbi is reported to be the only one of the Sultan's Ministers who has always been loyal to him. He has resisted all the efforts of the French authorities to suborn him, and this is said to be the reason for his replacement. His departure has upset the Nationalists.

8. The Resident-General, General Juin, speaking of the reforms in his opening address at the meeting of the Conseil du Gouvernement on 10th July, stated: "A reorganisation of the Makhzen has just taken place which gives to His Majesty the Sultan a real constitutional instrument of government in the form of an enlarged Council of Ministers and a Moroccan legal adviser, constituting the first step towards a future Council of State."

9. Criticism of the reforms has been expressed by the Communists and the Nationalists. The former criticise the appointment as delegates for the new posts of persons who are well known for their attachment to the colonial system. The latter state that the new delegates are puppets of the French authorities.

10. The Committee of the Independence Party (Parti de l'Istiqlal) have issued a communiqué, a copy of which I enclose,(1) in which they state that the Moroccan people will be justified in attaching no importance to reforms which consist simply of the appointment of delegates whose sole purpose is to act as a permanent mission of information and liaison between the Shereefian Government and the Protectorate Administration. The creation of these posts will be of no importance as long as the reins of power remain in the hands of the French Administration. Furthermore, these new nominations cannot be considered as an innovation, as two delegates existed previously, one for Economic Affairs and the other for Moslem Education, neither of whom has ever played a rôle of any importance. It is, therefore, the communiqué continues, a mistake for international opinion to consider the combination of the three former Viziers and the newly appointed delegates as a Council of Ministers. The communiqué terminates with a declaration that the first real reform is the abolition of the protectorate, the formation of a provisional Government to organise elections of a National Assembly, and the elaboration by the Assembly of a Constitution.

11. It remains to be seen whether these reforms are going to permit the Moroccans really to partake in the administration of the country. Much will depend on the quality and character of the new delegates and the extent to which their French colleagues are willing to co-operate with them. The Resident-General, General Juin, I am informed, feels confident that these reforms are an important step forward, and he is determined to do all in his power to make them a success.

12. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassadors in Paris and Cairo, to His Majesty's consular representatives in Tunis, Algiers, Tangier, Tetuan, Casablanca and Fez, to the Colonial Secretary, Gibraltar, and to the Secretary, Office of the West African Council, Accra.

I have, &c.

J. ISHERWOOD.

(1) Not printed.

Z 6455/60/28 No. 7

MOROCCO: RETURN OF ABDUL KRIM TO POWER POLITICS: SITUATION IN SPANISH ZONE

(1)

Consul-General Hope Gill to Mr. Bevin. (*Received* 14*th July*)

(No. 56)

Sir, *Tetuan, 4th July*, 1947

It seems advisable to try to assess the effects and their possible results in this country of the unexpected return of Abdelkerim to power politics a month ago.

2. It may be as well first to glance at his background and past. His name is really Sidi Mohammed and he is a Rifi Berber, born at Ajdir, on the Bay of Alhucemas, in about 1882, and therefore now about 65 years old. His father, Abdelkerim, and his grandfather, al Khattabi, before him had been the chosen chiefs (Rifi succession is seldom hereditary) of the Ait Khattab clan of the Beni Uriághel, by far the largest, richest and most powerful of all the tribes of the Rif. His training was that of a fighting sectional leader amongst warring tribes and families, when individual powers counted for everything and family descent for little, and in mountainous country where there had been internecine war from time immemorial. (In spite of the build-up given to him by the Cairo Radio, he can, of course, not claim descent from the Prophet's Second Caliph, Omar Ibn el Khattab.)

3. Mohammed ben Abdelkerim began to use a rifle at 10, went to the university at Fez after being schooled in the mountains —his younger brother M'hammad being sent by their progressively-minded father to the School of Mines in Madrid—and when he was qualified in Islamic law, he became a Qadi and spent several years in the service of the Spanish Administration at Melilla. There he learned Spanish well and he also edited the Arabic page of the local newspaper. But in 1919 he had a violent quarrel with a high Spanish official, who is said to have used insulting language toward him and his compatriots and to have struck him, and he was promptly gaoled. He escaped, however, in something under a year, at the cost of a broken leg and with a deep-seated hatred of the Spaniards, and returned to his tribe.

4. The Rif was then still unentered and unconquered by the Spanish army, which lay encamped around Melilla. Tribal warfare was still the Rifian rule, although the more far-sighted, his father among them, were already preaching a common front against the threat of Spain from Melilla. Sidi Mohammed ben Abdelkerim's qualities and single-minded purpose soon brought him into prominence. He won his way through considerable tribal fighting to a position of pre-eminence and finally of undisputed authority over the Beni Uriághel, and thereby over all neighbouring tribes. He consolidated the Ruafa for the first time in their lives and more often than not against their will into a disciplined guerrilla force gathering to oppose any further Spanish advance from the East. When his father was killed in 1920 during an attack on Tafersit, to which the Spanish advance had penetrated, he was chosen Qaid of the Beni Uriághel and became known generally as Abdelkerim.

5. He organised the Rifs and later the Jebala also against the Spaniards with almost unbroken success for five years. In 1921, with a few thousand of his own and neighbouring tribesmen only, he routed General Silvestre at Anual, killing nearly 20,000 of his men and inflicting one of its major disasters on Spanish arms. Action after action was sought by the Rifs and fought and won, until Spain's position in Morocco became precarious. In 1924

General Primo de Rivera, then Dictator of Spain, made himself High Commissioner and Commander-in-chief in Morocco, in order to take personal charge of the situation. He soon saw that the only hope of retrieving it lay in withdrawing all surviving Spanish troops right back to Melilla and to Tetuan–Ceuta, at either end of the zone, there to reinforce them and prepare a counter- attack. Before he arrived, however, thousands had been killed and a few hundreds captured, abandoned in the numerous isolated and waterless hilltop positions in which the Spanish High Command had unwisely scattered them. After General Primo de Rivera took charge, thousands more were lost in difficult and closely harassed withdrawal actions from Sheshawen and other large advanced garrisons. Reinforcements poured out from Spain and in the end the general commanded nearly 150,000 troops against Abdelkerim, who, when fighting the Spaniards, never had more than 10,000 men under arms at any one time. During the later stages of his Western campaign he had as many Jebala as Ruafa engaged under him, having captured the Shereef Raisuli, their spiritual and bandit chief and quondam ally of the Spaniards.

6. By 1925 Abdelkerim was the effective ruler of the greater part of the Spanish Zone. His organisation, civil as well as military, had from the beginning been remarkable. (It is interesting to report that he is now being slated by the Nationalists as first Moroccan Premier.) He chose his leaders and subordinates well. Every detail of man-power and material supplies was carefully prepared. Every move was planned and directed either from his general headquarters at Ajdir or from his brother M'hammad's advanced headquarters at Talambot, near here; and every action was carried out with a minimum of expenditure by mere handfuls of highly trained and expert sharpshooters operating with great mobility under daring but carefully controlled leaders. The Spanish infantry were no match for them: Spanish artillery never found them massed; individual foxholes protected them from air attack, such as it was. Only the families suffered from bombing, which hardened the men and strengthened the attacks. Captured arms and ammunition of every kind, including field guns, abounded, in addition to contraband arms, but the most sparing use was made of them, strict discipline was maintained from end to end of the mountains and a complete ascendancy was obtained in the military field. (This, I find, Ruafa and Jebala have never to this day forgotten.) The capital itself, with General Primo de Rivera in it, was besieged and its only communication left with Spain was by air, radio and a daily armoured train to Ceuta. The small, white house is still visible at the mountain-foot opposite Tetuan, where the Rifi field telephone was installed controlling operations and the siege, and by which reports and orders went to and from Abdelkerim at Ajdir, 200 miles away. It was no old-fashioned warfare and Abdelkerim was no old-fashioned Arab warrior, *pace The Times* leader writer of 27th June, but, on the contrary, a highly organised and intelligently conducted campaign under a native military (and organising) genius. It is as well to remember this nowadays.

7. Although I never met Abdelkerim in person, I was here or hereabout on the Spanish side of the lines all through the 1924 and 1925 fighting, was on occasion aware of planned attacks before the Spaniards and more than once offered facilities to go through the lines to watch the Rifians' and Jebala's victories over Spanish troops. I have since met and spoken with numbers of those who fought under Abdelkerim and have seen something of their exceptional energy, endurance and marksmanship, and I have recently visited his tribeland, the Beni Uriághel. It is for these reasons that I venture to submit these largely first-hand records and experiences.

8. Abdelkerim, however, overreached his strength when he allowed himself to be drawn into the Beni Zerual fighting, which broke out against the French in 1925. Had he confined his attention to the Spanish army, there is little doubt that he would have either driven it into the sea or the Spanish Government to terms amounting to a surrender of their zone of protectorate. As it was, he very nearly captured Fez, an eventuality which would have put the French in a very dangerous position in their zone. He failed, however, and failed also to take advantage of peace negotiations to secure a position of at least semi-independence. For him it was to be all or nothing. He was eventually defeated in 1926 by a combined Franco-Spanish operation and armies totalling more than a quarter of a million men. The Spaniards, having been relieved of much of the pressure by the French campaign and completed their plans for counter-attack, landed near Alhucemas Bay in September 1925; but it was the French penetration and threat to the Rif from the southern front which defeated Abdelkerim and to them he surrendered in May 1926.

9. Marshal Pétain, who, after the first French serious reverse, had to be despatched from Paris with large reinforcements to take command of the situation, reported Abdelkerim's as the most powerful and best-armed army that France had met in her colonial campaigns. Yet even at the end it never exceeded 20,000 trained men under arms at any one time. Its high individual quality (the average Rifi is more intelligent and more energetic than the average Spaniard or Moor), the inveterate fighting keenness and ability of every man, and their exceptionally able leadership, astonishing mobility and intimate knowledge of the ground were nearly always put to the best use by Abdelkerim, whose was the brain and personality behind it all.

10. These innate Rifian qualities remain. Twenty-one years of subjection and maladministration have passed over them, but they have not destroyed them nor even impaired them. This must never be lost sight of, until the Rif contains a population that is both well and self-ruled. At present it is the reverse. As I reported last year, there is discontent from end to end of the zone. The general attitude then was one of passive endurance of these things as an act of God, written in the book of fate: men were content to leave any remedy in His hands. But the Ruafa have never lost the inborn urge for both freedom, which they had always enjoyed and for so long prided themselves upon, and for revenge. These, with an intense love of their land, are their ruling passions. They have, moreover, a dangerous contempt for Spanish arms, and you will hardly find a Rifi of the high mountains or a Jibli of the lower who does not firmly believe that arms can be had, now as then, for the taking.

11. It is not possible this year, however, as I found last week in the Beni Uriághel, to converse so freely as it was last. Even at Ketama, a new order is posted forbidding the half-dozen local Spaniards from having commercial contact or traffic with the inhabitants except through the Spanish *Intervención*. There is a heavier air of suspicion. Spanish-paid spies, agents and informers are everywhere now, to a number which is sometimes said to amount to one in every five men one meets, but is probably about 5 per cent. As a result, men's lips are "sewn," as they say, and they talk only amongst proved friends, behind closed doors or in the small circles in which one can see them nowadays, sitting well out of earshot several hundred yards away from the market places where they meet. But the very existence and increase of the army of informers indicate the existence and increase of unrest. The 1945–46 famine has left the Rifians materially and numerically weakened to a considerable extent (the Beni Uriághel should by now number about 90,000, but I was told that they are only 70,000 but "all as strong as bulls and very healthy," according to the Spanish doctor who has charge of them). But the lack of aid from the Spanish "protector" during the famine and the way in which those in power were enabled to corner such supplies as there were, have still more embittered them against Spanish administration, which is also distrusted far and wide in this zone for allowing, conniving at or even organising, the withholding and selling in the towns of the ordinary food rations for the tribelands. Another and even more strongly resented feature of the foreign rule is the heavy "tertib" or agricultural and stock tax, which is, according to all tribal accounts, corruptly assessed and often brutally collected. In comparison with most other tribes that I have seen in the Rif, the Beni Uriághel are taller, stronger, better looking, better clothed and generally seem more prosperous, although one sees many of their *douars* now empty and falling into ruins, their occupants having fled the famine. The tribesmen that remain are clearly a force worth reckoning with, however. It is among tribesmen such as these and others of the central Rif that the warlike qualities remain, but the leadership has been lacking.

12. The problem now is, whether the return of Abdelkerim may supply that leadership. The fact must at least be borne in mind that his presence, as a free agent in Arab North Africa once more, may provide the one ingredient needed to make the mixture explosive again. Whether an explosion will occur depends probably less on the mixture than on how it is handled. A great deal will, of course, depend upon how Abdelkerim comports himself. His character and past foretell that he will prove formidable and dangerous to both France and Spain. From what one hears

of his declarations to the press in Egypt, he is already outspoken and uncompromising against the French, whilst deliberately and completely ignoring the Spaniards. His statements, for instance, of 21st June to the correspondent of the *Figaro* in Cairo were cross-headed "Abdelkerim parle en maître" and "Il faut annuler le Protectorat," and they were headed "If you need to live in my country, you are welcome, but never forget that I am the master of the house." In spite of every Spanish precaution every word of this sort is reported here in due course and naturally in exaggerated form. In Cairo, Abdelkerim has a combined political staff, headed by Abdelkhalak Torres, Allal al Fassi and Si Mohammed Benabud ("el Inglisi" because he is a son of a late British Moroccan *Semsar*). They have a host of lesser Moorish agents to hand and correspondence between Morocco and Egypt is no doubt constant. Incitement to actual revolt, if it does come from such political headquarters, and not from some internal cause such as a quarrel involving shooting between Spaniards and Moors, will come well prepared with plans and supported by promises and will fall on soil that has been made ready both by the Spanish Administration these twenty-one years and by the Nationalist activities of the last few. The Spaniards are now well known. The Moors are conscious now of nationhood. There can be little doubt, moreover, that the co-ordinating military leadership, in the person of M'hammad if not of Abdelkerim himself, could follow incitement to rise, for it would be almost impossible in these days of aircraft or along this ill-guarded coast and border to prevent anybody from entering the zone who really wished.

13. It is the same with arms. Reports of contraband in arms are on the increase, but imported arms are no *sine qua non*. Spaniards generally believe that the Moors still possess arms hidden. The Moors, on the contrary, affirm that there are none left in the country. The probability is that the mountain tribes have never been completely disarmed and that enough rifles and ammunition are laid by with which to take more. What matters most is that Spanish military prestige is still low and that Moorish and especially Rifian morale is high. It is necessary in this connexion to report that French military prestige also seems to be at a low level. In both French and Spanish Morocco the Nationalists have publicised the fact that, whereas Abdelkerim held out for five years, France collapsed in almost as many days—illogical, but convincing to some minds.

14. I had some indication in the Rif of the way in which the Spanish authorities affect to regard the future. The *Interventor* of Targuist, who is one of the very few Spaniards who speak Arabic and really seems to know something of his people and who is in control of half the Rif territory, assured me that it was safe to discount entirely any effect upon Morocco of Abdelkerim's return. He said that, amongst the old and middle-aged men, all who showed any ability and prominence were now in the Spanish camp, securely attached to Spanish interests by their own, while a completely new younger generation had grown up which knew not Abdelkerim. He refused to allow that there was any such thing as an Abdelkerim legend or that the memory of his leadership or feats persisted. I doubt if he is so out of touch as to believe all this himself. Nevertheless, he could have repeated the truisms that the terrain is now well known, has been thoroughly surveyed, is fully occupied, and contains a fair system of communications, while the network of *Intervenciones* with their military officers, officials of different kinds, Moorish as well as Spanish, and their *mokhaznis* or armed guards is spread over the whole zone and backed by an army of occupation inured to fighting and forming 10 per cent. of the population; so that nothing should be able to happen anywhere without the High Commissioner's knowledge, and that, if anything did happen anywhere, it could at once be dealt with.

15. All this is true enough, but the point is, whether such action would prove effective. In ordinary times it might, but now it might not. Evidence which I recently reported from two other Spanish sources was to the effect that the older generation of Moors, even in the Spanish armed forces, were much affected by the news of Abdelkerim's return—probably disaffected; that the Arabic broadcasts were impressing those who heard and retailed them with the importance being given outside Morocco to Abdelkerim; and that the Abdelkerim legend in the Rif was not dead but very much alive. The experience of fighting in the Spanish Civil War has, moreover, depreciated many a Rifi's regard for Spanish arms. Complaints, furthermore, have often been heard that Spanish officers sell their Moorish troops' rations—and it must not be forgotten that Spain has no Senegalese or other colonial soldiery to turn to, if her Moorish army begins to show signs of disaffection. This it has so far done only in failing to repress street demonstrations with sufficient force, for which some Moorish soldiers were court-martialled.

16. On the civil side, there are undoubtedly several hundred Qaids, Qadis, Khalifas and other Spanish-appointed Moorish officials, who have thrown in their lot irretrievably with the Spanish occupation and would lose everything, if Abdelkerim were to prevail once more in Morocco. But there has been a wavering noticeable here recently in the hitherto pro-Spanish Moorish ranks of officials (for instance, the Basha himself of Tetuan), amongst whom confidence in the protecting Power has declined and disagreement with the Spanish authorities has increased; and I know myself of numbers of other older men and greybeards who warmly welcome the news of Abdelkerim's return to freedom and who are by far more numerous and by no means negligible. Most of them live in their tribelands, but many in nearby exile, either at this end of the zone or in the other two, awaiting with all the Rifis' patience and determination the opportunity to return to their homes and lands. Moreover, it is as certain as anything can be that in those highly independent-minded but tradition-bound mountain tribes, the youth have been taught all the tales of the victories of the past and brought up in the age-old Rifi urge for independence and revenge. There are no Spanish schools for them and they have never received any other education than the Koranic and that of their kin. The Spanish Zone population, in a word, beneath a crust of unpopular governors, is hostile to the Spanish occupation.

17. This occupation is now complete and looks strong, but in a mountainous country having but one metalled road through it and, for the rest, mostly "pistas" which turn to mud in the rain, an autumn rising and a planned winter campaign could well prove dangerous. Most of the advantages of mechanical transport and arms would be neutralised. (Most of the tanks anyway seem to be immobile unless lorry-borne). The Spanish Air Force seems little likely to be more effective, except for bombing villages and markets, than it was in the last Rif War. It is in any case difficult to see what effective use Spain can make of air power in difficult country such as this, where no air-borne troops have yet been trained to operate. The knots of the network of *Intervenciones* would at once be cut off and isolated. The familiar pattern of 1924–25 would reappear—wastage of effort to try to relieve small sieges everywhere. Reinforcements and a considerable campaign would be necessary to enter and occupy the region again in strength.

18. Given the explosive ingredients of the present situation, the principal question to be asked is, whether a colonial war in North Morocco could be entered upon nowadays and in the present state of Spain and of world opinion and organisation. A subsidiary question must be, whether fighting would spread to the French Zone. But the preliminary question to be answered must still be, whether it could start. Before Abdelkerim's return to power politics it hardly could. Now, however, it more easily can. That is all that one can at present say here for certain—except perhaps to add that, if an explosion were to occur, it would not be a mere flash in the pan.

19. Much will depend, as I have suggested, on how Abdelkerim comports himself in Egypt, where he is presumably more open to Nationalist and chauvinistic advice than to any other. Something must also depend on Spanish and French reaction in Morocco to his activities. If this is repressive of the cause of nationalism and what is called progress by the Nationalists in Morocco, a trial of strength is, I believe, inevitable at some time. If, however, the Nationalist leaders, who, like Torres, el Fassi and Benabud in Egypt and Bennouna in the United States, have now burned their boats, were invited to return to Morocco and to take part in genuine reforms entailing an appreciable and progressive surrender of real power to Moorish representatives, it might perhaps be avoided; although I must say that I am not at all sanguine about this in so far as Spanish Morocco is concerned.

20. I venture therefore to hope that it may be found advisable and possible to influence the French Government to avoid trouble in some such way, a way contemplated by the State Department, I understand, and entailing an equal approach to both the French and the Nationalists and perhaps even requiring our intervention as honest broker. I venture to express this hope concerning the neighbouring zone, because I suspect that, only if they see that

real progress and reforms are being introduced there, will the Spanish Government and their High Commissioner here be influenced to take similar action in this zone, before it becomes too late.

21. In any event, I cannot but think that it would be wise if His Majesty's Government were to disassociate themselves in some way from the unfortunate impression which the concluding sentence of the leading article in *The Times* (still regarded as authoritative) of 27th June is certain to make and has already made here on those professing "legitimate Moorish aspirations." The statement that "it would be unfortunate if the influence of Abdel Krim should strengthen local forces of reaction" is likely to be taken from its context and quoted to show how little understanding there is, even in Great Britain, of the essentially progressive nature of the Nationalist and Independent movements. It was a tactless remark and could only help to harden their determination to fight, when ready, and to look for this end towards Abdelkerim.

22. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Cairo, His Excellency the Governor of Gibraltar, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Madrid, His Majesty's Consul-General at Tangier, and the acting British Consul-General at Rabat.

I have, &c.

C. G. HOPE GILL.

Z 6455/60/28 (2)

Mr. Bevin to Consul-General Hope Gill (Tetuan)

(No. 55) *Foreign Office,*
Sir, *13th August*, 1947

I have read with great interest your despatch No. 56 of 4th July on the possible results of the reappearance on the political scene of Abdul Krim, and wish to thank you for this careful and illuminating survey.

2. In the concluding paragraphs of the despatch you say that a trial of strength between the Nationalists and the French and Spaniards is inevitable if the reaction of the latter to Abdul Krim's activities is repressive, and in the belief that the Spanish authorities might perhaps follow a similar policy, if they saw that a more liberal policy was being adopted in the French Zone, you expressed the hope that I might find it possible to influence the French Government in that direction. I do not dispute that the outlook in Morocco appears very uncertain and that the French and Spanish authorities will have to show greater intelligence and initiative than in the past if they are to avoid serious trouble. The problem is, moreover, one in which His Majesty's Government are closely interested. But, as I explained in my despatch No. 18 of 27th February to Mr. Consul-General Brennan at Rabat, I am convinced that it would only arouse fresh suspicions if His Majesty's representatives in French North Africa were to intervene with advice or show interest in the activities of the Nationalist leaders. The same holds true of intervention with the French Government in Paris, and any influence which I may have in the matter with the United States Government will be exerted towards ensuring that they, too, shall refrain from action which, however well meant, is unlikely to achieve its direct object and might hinder collaboration with the French Government in other fields. The escape of Abdul Krim, though it may well accelerate developments, is not in my view sufficient to justify a departure from this policy.

3. Copies of this despatch are being sent to His Majesty's representatives at Cairo and Madrid and His Majesty's consular officers at Rabat and Tangier.

I am, &c.

ERNEST BEVIN.

Z 8103/52/69 No. 8

FRANCO-MOROCCAN RELATIONS: SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW GIVEN BY GENERAL JUIN TO PRESS CORRESPONDENT

Paris Chancery to Western Department. (*Received* 11*th September*)

Paris,
Dear Department, *4th September*, 1947

Figaro of 3rd September published an important interview given by General Juin to their special correspondent Jean Eparvier. The following is a summary of the main points, but we enclose(1) also a copy of the interview in case you wish to refer to it.

The general began by saying that he was not hostile to the Nationalists in so far as the latter wished for an evolution in the relations between the French and Moroccans and greater participation in the affairs of their own country. The Franco-Moroccan Treaty of 1912 imposed on France the duty of promoting this evolution, which would be completed when the country was sufficiently mature politically to govern itself. When that stage had been reached Morocco would have its own Government but would remain associated with France on the basis of common interests and common security. He wished to hasten this evolution but to avoid all undue haste. It would be premature to leave Morocco to its own devices. The country lacked technicians and if the French were to go it would be left defenceless.

The French Government had undertaken to introduce the reforms which would lead Moroccans towards their cherished objectives. The authority of the Sultan was not contested, since it was he who signed all the dahirs. But it was difficult to understand on what advice His Majesty had held up certain useful decisions, since before the recent appointments of "délégués" he had not been adequately informed on these questions. The Sultan had understood the necessity of these new appointments. The délégués, although they had no ministerial responsibility, would establish the necessary liaison between the Residence and the Sultan's Palace. The Sultan had nominated as his délégués men fitted for the conduct of affairs. Thus amongst them were two agricultural engineers and a doctor. The délégués were to be placed on a footing of equality with the French directors of the various services. They could examine all public affairs within their respective spheres of competence and could ask to see all official papers.

The most important reform was that of justice. There was to be a separation of the judiciary and the executive, and the authorities were now working on a new penal code and a code of procedure, which would be ready before the end of the year. As regards economic affairs, the "vital minimum," which had just been fixed at 3,750 fr. a month, was perhaps still insufficient, but there would be family allowances to be added to it and it would be constantly brought up to date in accordance with movements of prices. Moreover, trade union rights were to be given to certain categories of Moroccan workers.

General Juin continued that Abd el Krim had little popularity outside the Spanish Riff territory from which he came. Twenty-two years before he had proclaimed himself Sultan and head of the Moslems, which had caused disquiet to the Sultan of the time, the father of the present ruler.

The general then discussed the American attitude towards Morocco. He felt that the Americans were aware that the French position was solid and useful. They were in no way anxious to take the place of the French and Morocco interested them only in so far as if the French went, it might relapse into chaos and fall into other hands. Nationalists who looked to Washington for support were deceiving themselves. There had been talk of the request which had been addressed to U.N.O. on behalf of the countries of French North Africa. That was not serious. M. Lie received every day hundreds of letters of this kind.

We are sending a copy of this letter to Rabat, Tangier and Tetuan.

Yours ever,

CHANCERY.

(1) Not printed.

Z 8166/8166/28 No. 9

LEADING PERSONALITIES IN TANGIER, 1947

Mr. Mallet to Mr. Bevin. (*Received 12th September*)

(No. 88)

Sir, *Tangier, 8th September, 1947*

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith my annual report on leading personalities at Tangier for the year 1947.

I have, &c.
W. I. MALLET.

Enclosure in No. 9

Report on the Leading Personalities in the Tangier Zone of Morocco

EUROPEANS

1. *Apostoli, Giovanni*

Italian judge, appointed in succession to Fernando Malmusi, when the latter was revoked on account of his Fascist tendencies in 1945. Apostoli is not a brilliant jurist nor an outstanding personality, but he appears to enjoy a fair reputation for honesty locally.

2. *Artous, Louis*

French second-in-command of the International Police and virtually in control of it. An agreeable and shrewd personality, who effectively presses French interests.

3. *Bastianelli, Auguste*

Director of French Public Instruction in Tangier. The institutions he controls cover some 5,000 pupils. Politically he took the line of least resistance through the war. He is an able administrator, but is not well liked by his staff.

4. *Betanzos, Reverend Father Antonio*

Spaniard, born 1863. Franciscan. Bishop of the Diocese of Gallipoli, which includes the Spanish Zone of Morocco (except Ceuta and Melilla), and Apostolic Vicar of Tangier. Known to have Monarchist sympathies. Has great influence with the authorities, but does not systematically use it in political matters. He has interceded in favour of Republican Spaniards in trouble under the present régime. Probably instigated by Italian Franciscans, he persuaded the Spanish authorities to reverse their decision to close an Italian Republican Fascist school established soon after the armistice with Italy. He has a very intelligent and able secretary, Padre López (born 1893).

5. *Cracco, François*

Assistant Administrator of Finance. He is the Belgian nominee for that important post, and has acquitted himself with great efficiency and energy. He is a man of too high calibre for the job, and has stated that when the immediate problem of putting the administration on its feet financially is overcome, he sees little that would induce him to stay in Tangier. M. Cracco is good socially, and, speaking as he does, good English, mixes freely with the British community.

6. *Crambes, Dr.*

French Vice-President of the Legislative Assembly, and president of the Anciens Combattants. He is generally regarded as being friendly in his attitude towards us.

7. *De los Campos, Villarejo*

Spaniard, born about 1900. Procureur of the Mixed Court, a post which he combines with similar functions in Tetuan. Rarely visits Tangier. Has British wife of Gibraltar origin and is believed to be not unfriendly.

8. *Ellis, Lieutenant-Colonel W. F., C.M.G., O.B.E.*

British Vice-President of the Legislative Assembly. Retiring from the R.A.M.C., Colonel Ellis originally came to Tangier over twenty years ago as medical practitioner. He later founded the prosperous firm of Ellis and Co. During the war he was chief of the Press Office and received the C.M.G. in recognition of his work. He is an able and hard-headed business man, with a finger in many Tangier pies and extremely well informed on Tangier subjects, but his views are apt to be coloured by his own personal interest. He is correspondent of the London *Times*. One of the most forceful personalities in Tangier.

9. *Fesser, Adolfo*

Spanish lawyer, born about 1895. Ran with the hare and hunted with the hounds throughout the civil war. He has done precisely the same as regards his sympathies in the present war. Garrulous and untrustworthy, but able.

10. *Girardière, Edmond*

French Assistant Administrator of Native Affairs. An intelligent and able man, with considerable administrative experience, who appears to have the interests of the natives genuinely at heart.

11. *González Gordon, Pedro*

Spaniard, born about 1886. Head of the sherry firm of González Byass. Very wealthy. Completely pro-British, speaks English perfectly, related to the Gilbey family. Monarchist and anti-Falange.

12. *Humbert, René*

French member of the Legislative Assembly, and Director of the Port Concession.

13. *Jecquier, Daniel*

Retired French banker, very rich. M. Jecquier has always been friendly to this consulate-general. He owns a great deal of land, and has frequently been approached by various persons for sale of land for such purposes as aerodromes and wireless stations.

14. *Katzaros, John*

Of Greek origin, has been naturalised as a British subject. The Katzaros family have been connected with the British Legation and subsequently consulate-general for the past sixty years, and were generally thought in Tangier to be British. They talk English at home. John Katzaros is secretary to the Legislative Assembly.

15. *Legrand, Lieutenant-Colonel V. J.*

Chief of Police. The colonel is a nominee of the Belgian Government and was accompanied by nine other Belgian police officials. He gets on well with the French, who have made much of him. He does not appear to be as alive as his subordinates are to an undercurrent of French hostility to the Belgians. He is very much influenced by his French second-in-command, Commandant Artous.

16. *Magalhaes Correia, Vice-Admiral Luis*

Administrator. Portuguese. The candidature of the vice-admiral as Administrator was very strongly pressed by the Portuguese Government for prestige reasons, and they insisted that, in spite of his birth in 1878, he did not appear to be a day older than 60. In fact, he is too old for his job, which requires drive and persistence as well as administrative ability and honesty. He is largely run by his son-in-law, Commander Roboredo, an able man whom no one quite trusts. Besides his own language, he speaks passable English and French, although his delivery in all languages is halting. He is genuinely pro-British.

17. *Melenotte, Raoul*

Chief engineer of the Public Works of the Zone. A pleasant type of French official.

18. *Merry, Diaz Manuel*

Spanish judge of the Mixed Court, born about 1886. An able lawyer, but given to deciding cases by the light of reason rather than the rule of law, so that many of his decisions are reversed on appeal. Corruptible.

19. *Parladé, Jaime*

Spaniard, born about 1900. Educated at Stonyhurst. Originally an officer in the artillery and later in the International Gendarmerie of the International Zone. Remained in Tangier until just before end of civil war, in which he participated on the side of General Franco. Is now managing director of the local telephone company, which he runs efficiently; also engages in miscellaneous commercial transactions of a speculative kind. Affects to be pro-British, but was friendly to Axis during the war.

20. *Rafferty, Michael Henry*

Born 1877, British judge on the Mixed Court. Judge Rafferty is getting too old for his job, and while nobody questions his integrity, he is generally regarded as being easily influenced and having little will of his own.

21. *Rodière, Yves*

French procureur of the Mixed Court, born in 1885. Member of French judicial service. Able and very hard-working. Has spent most of his career in Morocco. Anti-British and very corruptible.

22. *Tovar, Duke of, and Marqués de Gauna*

Son of a former Spanish Ambassador in Rome. Lived in Tangier unmolested throughout the war in spite of his Royalist sympathies. As a grandee of Spain he has recently taken a public stand as the principal Royalist in Tangier. His royalism is probably a matter of ideology and loyalty, and, prodigiously fat as he is, he does not give the impression of a man of action. Very rich.

23. *Vallet, Jean*

Born 23rd May, 1885. Appointed by Vichy as French judge at Tribunal Mixte. In 1940 was head of local "Action Française en Egypte" and was at that time described as one of the most dangerous Frenchmen in Egypt. Stated on all sides to be anti-British and to have been 100 per cent. collaborationist.

24. *Wauters, Alfred*

Born 1912. Belgian judge of the Mixed Court appointed to replace M. de Foy. Worked with Belgian Government in United Kingdom from 1943. Was Premier Substitut du Procureur du Roi up to date of his appointment to Tangier.

JEWS

1. *Abensur, Aaron*

British subject, born about 1895. Owns, with his brother Moses (Maurice), the local banking-house of Moses Pariente, established in 1844, with which this consulate-general and the former British Legation have banked for at least sixty years. Father naturalised in 1896 by special Act of Parliament on account of the family's long services to the Crown. Of undoubted loyalty, he is always ready to help His Majesty's Consulate-General and is a very sound and reliable banker.

2. *Alster, Jakob*

Banker. Polish born, 30th December, 1901. Has very bad reputation but is generally regarded as most able business man in Tangier.

3. *Bendrao Ruah, Isaac*

Born Tangier, 26th December, 1900. Said to be richest man in Tangier, very friendly with the more influential section of the Spanish colony and claims to be a close personal friend of General Varela.

4. *Bengualid, Semtob*

Moroccan subject, born about 1880. Local head of the firm of Isaac and Joseph Cohen, the principal importers of British goods. Slightly in difficulties of late. Hard worker and highly respected. Jew member of the Legislative Assembly of the International Zone.

5. *Hassan, Joseph*

Portuguese subject, born about 1880. Very rich. Head of the Hassan family, who own the Salvador Hassan Bank. Bank's Tetuan agency acted as Franco's bankers in the civil war, other banks in the Spanish Zone being either foreign and non-interventionist or else controlled by Republican Madrid.

6. *Salama Benatar, Isaac and Samuel*

Have made a vast fortune during the war. Financial activities not above suspicion, but have never been black-listed.

MOSLEMS

1. *Hajj Mahammad ben Abdelkrim Tazi*

The Sultan's Mendoub at Tangier. Born in 1866. Was Sultan's representative in Tangier from 1913 to 1924, first appointed Mendoub in 1928, driven out by Spaniards on arrival of Germans in 1941 and retired to Rabat. Returned to his post on 11th October, 1945, when the International régime was re-established. Expresses great admiration of, and friendship for, England and English institutions, having paid several visits to United Kingdom, where he had family connexions (chiefly Fez families in Manchester). Although genial and benign, is reported to indulge in typically oriental oppression of the poor. Is now old and ailing and leaves things in the hands of his son.

2. *Si Ahmed ben Hajj Majammad Tazi*

The Mendoub's son and his First Khalifa. Born in 1901. Fought on Abdelkrim's side in the Riff campaign, 1926. Appointed Governor of Tangier prison, 1928. Later held post of Second Khalifa to his father until both were expelled in 1941. While

in Rabat was Directeur de Ravitaillement. Returned with Mendoub on 11th October, 1945. Is less genial than his father, whom he more or less rules, plays the French game assiduously and is much disliked by Moorish population of Tangier.

3. *Si Mohammed ben Abderrahman Saidi*

The Mendoub's Second Khalifa. Born about 1896. Native of Tangier. Son-in-law of Si Kaddor ben Ghabrit, the Sultan's "chef du protocole" in Paris. Has held minor posts at Mogador, Meknes and Rabat. Appointed to present position on 11th October, 1945. Modest, unassuming and friendly.

4. *Si Mohammed ben Driss ben Rahmoun*

Kadi of Tangier. Born 1876 but does not look his age. Native of Fez. Formerly scribe at court of the Sultan Moulay Abdelaziz. Present at Paris and Madrid conferences on Tangier. Held post of Kadi at Mogador. Appointed to Tangier on re-establishment of International régime. Has bad reputation, reported to insist on bribes before signing documents or giving judgment. Professes to be a friend of England.

5. *Moulay Ahmed el-Amrani*

Mohtassib of Tangier, appointed 11th October, 1945. Born in 1871. Native of Fez. After learning trade of carpenter, became successively scribe to Mohtassib, Khalifa to Mohtassib and finally Mohtassib.

6. *Si Abdessalam Shebaa*

Born in 1881. Member of good old Tangier family. Holds post of "Bou Mouarit" (Curateur des Successions vacantes) and is also member of the Legislative Assembly. At the request of Mendoub remained in Tangier during Spanish occupation to help with supply questions. Dependable and friendly.

7. *Moulay Ahmed ben Hajj Abdessalam el-Wazzani*

Born in 1876. Son of well-known Shereef of Wazzan. Was Pasha of Wazzan, now retired.

8. *Sidi Abdessalam el-Bakkali*

Born in 1896. Scribe at port of Tangier and member of Legislative Assembly. Head of family of Shereefs which is responsible for guardianship of tomb of Tangier's patron saint, Sidi Bou Arrakia.

9. *Sidi Ahmed ben Sidi Mohammed ben Siddiq el-Ghomari*

Born in 1901. Chief of the Derkaoua Fraternity, with some 400 followers in Tangier and others in surrounding tribes. Studied at Al-Azhar University, Cairo, and is anxious to return to Egypt. Clever and untrustworthy, ready to work for highest bidder. A source of worry and fear to the French authorities.

10. *Si Abdelkrim Erkiouak*

Born in 1896. Notary and senior scribe in International Administration. Organiser of demonstration involving procession of some 3,000 natives through streets in 1947. Worked steadily for our cause during the war. Extremely useful contact and absolutely dependable.

11. *Si Abderrahman Menebhi*

Son of the late Sir Mehdi-el-Menebhi, G.C.M.G., and brother-in-law of the Pasha of Marrakesh, El Glaoui. Enjoys a certain prestige as the son of his father, but not very reliable or of strong character. Is under French influence.

12. *Sidi Mohammed al-Mekki Nasiri*

Aged about 40, formerly resident in Tetuan. Founder and leader of Moroccan Unity Party, editor of party's newspapers (*Al-Wahdah al-Maghribia*, suppressed by Spanish authorities, Tetuan; *La Voix du Maroc*, suspended for six months in 1947 by Committee of Control, Tangier). Founder and director of Moulay al-Mahdi Institute, Tetuan, with branch in Tangier. Studied in Cairo 1927–31 and revisited Egypt 1937–38 (where he still has good contacts) to found Beit-al-Maghrib. Probably more moderate Nationalist than some of his followers; professes deep admiration for Great Britain and United States, inclined to be wordy.

13. *Si Abdallah Guennoun*

Aged 38. Taught in Franco-Arab school, left in order to start a "free" (*i.e.*, not officially controlled) school 1937. New school built by public subscription and opened 1947. French and Spaniards have both sought his allegiance, but he is reputed to be non-political. In any case, the French are much less suspicious of his activities than they are of Nusiri's.

14. *Ahmed Belghiti Tlemsani*

Aged about 35. Father a French subject (from Tlemçen). Editor of Arabic newspaper *Mourrakouch*, said to be financed by French. Newspaper suspended by Committee of Control for six months in 1947 on account of articles denouncing Spanish methods in Spanish Zone.

15. *Si Ahmed Erkaina*

Aged 40. Owns large bakery. Probably most intelligent and outspoken of six Moorish members of Legislative Assembly.

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